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Policy Space for Development in the WTO and Beyond: 








Global governance in intellectual property (IP) has changed dramatically in the 
last two decades, and these changes have profound – and worrying – implications for late 
development. What was once principally an instrument of national policy is now 
increasingly subject to international disciplines, as the world moves ever-closer to 
harmonization in the area of IP management. But moving toward harmonization and 
achieving harmonization are different matters, and it is essential to keep in mind that the 
former and not the latter describes contemporary arrangements: the trend is toward a 
reduction in policy space, a feature that many scholars and activists point to with great 
concern (Gallagher, 2005), but the outcome remains one where countries retain space for 
autonomous IP management.  
 
This paper examines the relationship between IP and development, presenting a 
framework for assessing IP regimes both cross-nationally and over time. It is then shown 
how the trend toward harmonization places new and significant restrictions on 
developing countries’ opportunities for policy innovation in IP management. The 
implications of harmonization for a range of issues are then considered, including late 
industrialization, promotion of public health, and protection of biodiversity.  
 
The paper shows that the new regulations are most accentuated at the regional and 
bilateral level. Thus, for all of the concerns that academics and policy analysts have 
legitimately and rightly expressed over TRIPS, the biggest threat to using IP policy as 
tool for realizing development objectives comes not so much from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as from bilateral and regional Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) between developed and developing countries. I demonstrate this by examining 
various aspects of IP policy: over and over, we see that countries that are parties to such 
PTAs have significantly less autonomy in their management of IP. In the conclusion, a 
set of policy recommendations are put forth, at both regional and multilateral levels, for 
restoring countries’ ability to use IP as a tool for economic development. 
 
The policy challenges are twofold: developing countries must utilize and exploit 
the remaining opportunities under TRIPS to use IP management for national development 
purposes, and developing countries must be careful to avoid bargaining away their 
remaining rights under PTAs. 
 
1 I am grateful to the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts: 
Shamnad Basheer, Carlos Correa, Kevin Gallagher, Duncan Matthews, Pedro Roffe, and Tim Wise. I also 
wish to thank Minona Heaviland for assistance with the figures. All remaining errors are mine. 
   1 





I. Intellectual Property (IP) and Development: Background 
 
Property rights are rules and regulations regarding the establishment, use, and 
protection of property. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are a special subset on account 
of the distinct characteristics of the property they regulate. Specifically, knowledge is 
non-rivalrous (i.e. it can be used simultaneously by multiple people) and inexhaustible 
(i.e. one person’s use does not affect the amount left for anyone else to use). These 
characteristics mean that IPRs perform different economic and social functions than 
property rights in “normal” goods, and, moreover, that IPRs are the subject of intense 
political contestation.  
 
Most analyses of IPRs focus on patents and copyrights, with the basic distinction 
being that the former protect the ideas underlying inventions while the latter protect 
forms of expression. To provide an example, one can patent a device for recording love 
songs and one can copyright the melody and lyrics to a love song, but one cannot patent 
the idea of a love song. In this paper I focus on patents, which are arguably of greatest 
importance for developing countries.
1  
 
Patents confer limited monopoly rights over inventions that are new, non-obvious, 
and have technological application. Thus, patents are not available to knowledge that 
already exists, or that mark only minor steps of innovation, or that are trivial and cannot 
be put to use. Of course, these criteria are vague, and national patent offices 
operationalize them differently. As we shall see, this provides countries with a significant 
amount of policy discretion.  
 
The rights conferred by patents are limited in three significant ways, and the 
politics of IP can be conceptualised as conflicts over these limitations. First, patents are 
not conferred automatically upon possession. Rather, private ownership rights are granted 
by the state, typically a national patent office, only where applicants demonstrate that 
their inventions satisfy the criteria of patentability. With application central to the process 
of establishing ownership, governments can delineate what ideas and innovations can be 
owned privately within their territory.  
 
A second limitation is that patent rights always include various exceptions to 
patent-holders’ ability to exert control over the use and distribution of their property. 
Patent regimes include provisions by which third parties retain automatic access and 
rights to use the idea. The ability to experiment on the basis of disclosed information is 
an example: patent-holders cannot prevent it, third parties do not have to obtain 
permission to undertake such activities, and the exception is not time-bounded. Patent 
regimes also include non-automatic exceptions, where, under certain conditions, third 
parties can petition the state for access. A compulsory license, for example, allows a 
domestic manufacturer to produce a patented good without the authorization of the 
patent-holder. Because non-automatic exceptions dilute patent-holders’ exclusive rights 
more significantly, they are restricted and time-bounded. Nevertheless, all countries 
condition the rights of ownership and control of knowledge on the prescription and 
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proscription of certain activities and practices, and clauses that stipulate the conditions 
and grounds for issuing compulsory licenses are standard features of IP regimes.  
 
A third limitation is temporal. Patents expire; at some point what is treated as 
private property enters the public domain, where access to and use of the knowledge is 
unrestricted. It is worth emphasizing that patent rights are also limited in a territorial 
sense, in that they are national and the rights conferred end at the border.
2 This means 
that potential patentees must apply for patents in each country where they wish to secure 
protection, and they must defend their patents in each country as well. Even where 
patents are applied for and granted on a regional basis, e.g. in the European Union, 
protection and enforcement remains national.  
 
These three limitations constitute axes of variation. When national patent regimes 
change, the changes can be conceptualised in terms of these dimensions: the processes by 
which knowledge becomes privately owned, the extent of the rights of patent-holders and 
third parties, and how long the rights last.
3  
 
Designing IP systems entails difficult and unavoidable trade-offs between 
providing incentives for the creation of knowledge and facilitating the use of knowledge. 
IPRs can encourage knowledge creation by providing incentives for innovation: 
innovators can invest their time and resources in attempting to generate new products 
with confidence that the protection to be granted will allow them to enjoy the returns. In 
the absence of IPRs, inventions may take on the character of public goods and, 
subsequently, be subject to traditional collective action problems resulting in 
underprovision. But IPRs also restrict knowledge dissemination, since they give owners 
control over the distribution and marketing of the new knowledge, including the 
conditions under which the knowledge can be accessed and used by third parties.
4 The 
trade-off is that without IPRs, some knowledge may not exist; with too much protection, 
on the other hand, third parties may suffer from reduced access to new knowledge.  
Limited access, in turn, can rebound negatively on future innovation, to the extent that 
knowledge creation is an incremental process.  
 
A key point of this review of the basic economics of IP is not simply that 
countries’ IP regimes constitute the balance between incentives for the creation of 
knowledge and incentives for the dissemination and use of new knowledge, but that a 
single set of laws and institutions cannot maximize both objectives. That is, IP regimes 
aim to maximize two desirable – but unavoidably conflicting – social objectives: that 
knowledge be created, and that knowledge be used. The graphs in Figure 1 present a 
simple conceptualisation of the trade-offs. Where incentives for either knowledge 
generation or knowledge use are insufficient, the benefits of the IP regime are minimal. 
At some point, however, the optimal balance yields maximum benefits, indicated by 
points A, B, and C. The inclusion of three separate curves is to show that the relationship 
between IP and knowledge use differs in different settings; the optimal balance of 
incentives for the generation and use of knowledge depends on a variety of national 
characteristics that affect the degree to which local actors respond to different sorts of 
incentives. 
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To gain insights on the national distribution of patenting and innovative 
capacities, Table One provides data on patents granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), from 1997-2004. A number of points jump off the page. 
First, firms and organizations from the top ten developed countries account for more than 
ninety percent of all patents granted. Second, the US, Japan, and Germany alone account 
for nearly eighty percent. Third, the firms and organizations from the top ten developing 
and transition economies account for less than seven percent, with greater than five 
percent coming from Taiwan and South Korea. The combined total of the next eight 
highest ranking countries is a mere 1.36%, slightly more than Italy. 
Incentives for Knowledge Creation relative to  
Incentives for Knowledge Use 
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Table 1: Patents Granted by USPTO 
(1997-2004) 
 
Top 10 Developed Countries  Percent of Total
*
1.  USA 53.16% 
2.  Japan 20.64% 
3.  Germany 6.50% 
4.  France 2.39% 
5.  United Kingdom  2.28% 
6.  Canada 2.09% 
7.  Italy 1.03% 
8.  Sweden 0.91% 
9.  Switzerland 0.84% 
10. Netherlands 0.80% 
Sub-Total 90.65% 
  
Top Ten Developing and Transition Countries  Percent of Total
*
1.  Taiwan 2.87% 





5.  Hong Kong  0.13% 
6.  China 0.12% 
7.  India 0.12% 
8.  Russia 0.12% 
9.  South Africa  0.07% 
10. Brazil 0.06% 
Sub-Total 6.49%   
 
*Total is greater than the sum of the two sub-totals, which only include patents from the twenty 
countries in the table.
 
 
**High-income country according to World Bank, but classified as “developing country” in TRIPS.  
 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office (www.uspto.gov). 
 
 
How countries prioritize the quests for creating and using knowledge have 
traditionally affected where the balance is struck in a given country at a given time. 
Different countries have their own profiles as “creators” or “users” of patentable 
knowledge. Whereas Table One demonstrates developed countries’ huge advantages in 
innovative activities (with the important exceptions of Taiwan and South Korea), Table 
Two, which examines patent applications according to residency of applicant, suggests  
that developing countries are generally importers of knowledge. Even in the countries 
that the World Bank classifies as “high income,” non-resident applications overwhelm 
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resident applications, a reflection of US dominance in this area. But the asymmetries are 
even greater in the developing world. Residents account for less than three percent of 
patent applications in middle-income countries and only one-fifth of one percent in low-
income countries. 
 
In countries with higher levels of innovation (i.e. where more research and 
development tends to produce new knowledge), it has made sense for these countries to 
set incentives to encourage the creation of knowledge.
5 In contrast, in countries with 
lower levels of innovation, where most new knowledge that is used is imported from 
abroad, the incentives were typically set to encourage dissemination and use of new 
knowledge and ideas.  
 
To be sure, national IP regimes have not always reflected countries’ scientific and 
innovative profiles. Historically, though, diversity in national patent regimes – both 
cross-nationally and longitudinally – has corresponded to these basic national 
characteristics. Wealthier countries, with higher levels of innovation (or, more accurately, 
higher levels of “patentable” innovation), have typically offered more IP protection than 
poorer countries. Wealthier countries have made patents available and easier to obtain on 
a wider range of goods, have placed fewer restrictions on what patent-owners must do to 
retain exclusive rights, and have offered longer periods of patent protection. The 
relationship between national income and the relative incentives toward knowledge-
creation and knowledge-use is best represented by a j-curve (see Figure Two). As 
countries become more industrialized and thus have greater capacity to use cutting-edge 
knowledge, their patent regimes tend to facilitate local firms’ ability to access such 
knowledge (hence the dip toward point O); later, as they develop more indigenous 
innovative capacities, countries’ patent regimes tend to emphasize incentives for 
knowledge-generation (toward point P). 
 




* A.  Non-Resident Applications as Share of Total 
Applications 
High income  82.28% 
Middle income  97.61% 
Low income  99.79%   
*World Bank Classifications 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
 
National variation was facilitated by a permissive international regime. Prior to 
the Uruguay Round, international governance in the issue-area of IP was weak, both 
procedurally and substantively. Because IP was not considered “trade-related,” the 
treatment of IP was not regulated by multilateral trade institutions (e.g., General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]). Instead, the principal international covenant 
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for patents was the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which 
allowed countries a significant degree of flexibility in designing their patent regimes. 
Although parties to the Paris Convention pledged to abide by the norms of non-
discrimination and national treatment (i.e., they would not treat patent applications and 
patents differently depending on the country of origin), they retained virtually complete 
autonomy in designing national patent legislation. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, global governance in IP underwent a sea 
change, as developed countries, led by the U.S., pushed for stronger enforcement of a less 
flexible set of regulations regarding the treatment of IP. The goal, in essence, was to 
universalise OECD-style IP protection (i.e. to eliminate the trough, illustrated by point O 
on Figure Two, for all but the poorest countries).  
 
The increased prominence of IP in U.S. foreign policy is a story of sectoral 
politics, in which well-organized industry groups representing the biotech, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software industries pushed the U.S. government to 
use trade sanctions against countries that were argued to be lax in protecting their 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks.
6 In 1984, Congress amended Section 301 of Trade 
Act of 1974 to make violation of intellectual property rights “actionable.” As the business 
constituency for stronger IP protection grew, the same coalition succeeded in obtaining 
another amendment to Section 301 in 1988—“Special 301,” which heightened the United 
States Trade Representative’s (USTR) authority to act against countries that provided 























   7 





Figure 2: Historical Relationship between Level of Development  




















































































In addition to unilateral strategies of IPR enforcement, the U.S. also insisted on 
integrating the theme of IP into the Uruguay Round negotiations in order to establish a 
new set of global standards to guide countries’ IP regimes. Integrating IP into the 
multilateral trade regime would accomplish two goals simultaneously: it would take a 
giant step toward harmonization of IP, and it would convert the new standards into 
enforceable international law, where violators could be punished with retaliatory trade 
sanctions. The product of this campaign is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which creates new global standards regarding 
virtually all aspects of how countries treat IP.  
 
TRIPS places significantly greater limitations on how countries configure their 
patent regimes. The reduction of policy space under TRIPS is best illustrated with 
reference to the three axes of variation noted above: establishing private rights over 
knowledge becomes more automatic, the rights are more absolute, and they last longer. 
Whereas countries could previously deny patents to certain types of inventions so as to 
encourage reverse-engineering and lower the barriers to entry in technologically-
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intensive sectors, now countries must offer patents in virtually all fields. Whereas 
countries could include extensive exceptions to patent-holders’ monopoly rights in order  
to facilitate broad access to patented knowledge, TRIPS strengthens the rights of 
patentees to control access and use of patented information. Whereas countries could 
make enjoyment of the monopoly rights conferred by patents conditional upon local 
production or licensing and transferring technology to local users, TRIPS limits how 
governments regulate patent-holders. And whereas countries could offer patents of short 
duration to increase the entry of knowledge into the public domain, TRIPS requires that 
the strengthened rights of patent holders extend for twenty-year patent terms.  
 
Thus, TRIPS makes it more difficult for developing countries to gear the 
management of IPRs toward speeding the pace of local technological diffusion and 
spurring indigenous technological development.
8 Because TRIPS focuses primarily on 
establishing incentives for innovation and knowledge-generation, activities which occur 
disproportionately in developed countries, it limits developing countries’ rights to design 
patent regimes to encourage imitation and technological learning. In sum, TRIPS ushers 
in a new relationship between patent regimes and level of development, as illustrated by 
Figure Three. 
 
One concession granted to the developing countries regarded transition periods 
for implementation: while all countries were required to introduce national treatment and 
non-discrimination immediately into their existing IPR laws, developing countries had 
until January 2000 to bring their IPR regimes into full conformity with the WTO, and the 
least-developed countries were given until 2006.
9 Special transition periods were 
included for pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and here, too, the least-developed countries 
are granted additional time. Eventually, when most transition periods are over, developed 
and developing countries will be subject to the same standards for IP management, with 
the poorest countries still remaining exempt from many obligations. This new – but still 
bifurcated – set of obligations is indicated by the lower bar in Figure Three. 
 
Notwithstanding the very real constraints set by TRIPS, the agreement still leaves 
room for national variation in how countries treat intellectual property. The borders of the 
upper bar in Figure Three, particularly the bottom border of the upper-right bar, should be 
viewed as imprecise. Countries may exhibit substantial variation in their patent regimes, 
all while being compliant with TRIPS; and there is room within TRIPS for countries to 
develop dynamic patent regimes (CIPR, 2002; Reichman, 1997). To quote a prominent 
IPR scholar who has also been a strong critic of TRIPS, “Developing countries were able 
in the pre-TRIPS era to define patent policies with a great degree of freedom. This has 
changed dramatically, but it is still possible to design patent laws taking into account 
broader developmental objectives and, particularly, the creation of a legal environment to 






   9 





relaxing the standards of IP protection in strategic sectors to facilitate access to foreign 






















































































National Level of Income 
 
 
II. The New Global Politics of IP: Multilateralism and Regionalism 
 
More than a decade after the introduction of TRIPS, the governance of IP remains 
one of the most charged issues on the international agenda. On the one hand, many 
developing countries resent and resist the imposition of new standards for the 
establishment and protection of IP that go far beyond what countries have typically 
offered at similar stages of development. At the least they have sought consolidation and 
confirmation of the flexibilities for IP management that remain under TRIPS. The Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (WTO, 2001), for example, was the result of a 
coordinated campaign by developing countries to gain a clear affirmation of the rights set 
forth in TRIPS.
10 More ambitiously, developing countries seek to retain their ability to 
use IP management as a tool for achieving broader development goals by, for example, 
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On the other hand, most developed countries regard the standards for IP 
















imitation 1: How Private Rights to Knowledge are Obtained 




technology or to lower the prices of technologically-intensive consumer and producer 
goods (e.g. pharmaceuticals, seeds, and software).  
 
ion established by TRIPS as too weak and too easily circumvented. They 
harmonize IP protection at a higher level, and thereby guarantee high returns for their 
own innovative firms that benefit from IPRs. Thus, developed countries – especially th
U.S. – have continued to apply direct pressure on countries to exceed their obligations 
under TRIPS. Most importantly, the U.S. secures heightened IP protection through 
bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that offer market access 
above and beyond what is available in the WTO in exchange for IP practices that are
above and beyond what is required under TRIPS.
11 Indeed, whereas TRIPS leaves spa
for countries to tailor their IP regimes to national development objectives, the space 
under PTAs is dramatically reduced.  
 
ents. The key points are summarized in the accompanying tables. The discussion 
is organized around the three limitations: the processes by which private rights to 
knowledge are obtained (Table 3); the extent of and exceptions to the private right
(Table 4); and the duration of the rights (Table 5). Within each sub-section, I discuss
significance for development policy of important policy areas, and I explain the options 
available to countries under TRIPS, and then under PTAs. As we shall see, PTAs bring I
much closer to actual harmonization.  
 
usly simplistic to discuss PTAs as a single entity, as they exhibit considerable 
differences. The US and EU, the two principal partners for such agreements, have 
different priorities in integrating IP into PTAs. PTAs negotiated with the US extend
obligations beyond TRIPS more consistently than do those with the EU (Pugatch, 2005)
I focus on US PTAs.
12 But US PTAs differ not only from EU PTAs, but from each other: 
all US PTAs are not alike. Indeed, the details of the IP provisions within any given 
agreement are bargaining outcomes. Thus, general statements regarding IP regulatio
PTAs (US or otherwise) run the risk of distorting via oversimplification. That said, with 
regard to virtually any policy area, the differences between various PTAs tend to be less 
than the differences between TRIPS and the PTA closest to TRIPS, so there is a good 
deal that can be illuminated with simplifications. Simply stated, too much analysis of th
differences between PTAs without considering how the entire genre differs from TRIPS 




nted. This has historically been a critical feature that differentiated national 
approaches toward IP. Many countries refused to grant patents to certain products, a
the duration of patent terms often varied by type of product.
13 Providing local producers
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The new limitations on scope that derive from TRIPS mean that countries can no 
longer   
ugs – some 
 
One contentious issue related to pharmaceutical patents in the TRIPS negotiations 
regarde
 in 
The policy question, then, is whether countries should apply “pipeline” 
protect atent in 
 
n important exception to expanded scope is in the area of genetic resources. 
Article y, 
unrestricted access to foreign knowledge in key sectors has historically been a critical 
dimension of strategies for late industrialization, for it facilitates local firms’ abilities to
adapt and build upon foreign innovations. Likewise, patents were often denied to restrain
prices, facilitate sharing of knowledge, and ensure that local actors (e.g. farmers) could 
continuously adapt to changing environmental conditions. 
 
 27 requires countries to grant patents of twenty years in all fields of technolog
This is a new definition of the term “non-discrimination,” no longer referring to 
countries’ practices vis-a-vis other countries, but rather, vis-à-vis different econo
sectors. Of course, any individual patent application can be denied on the standard 
grounds of novelty, inventiveness, and utility, and countries’ national patent offices
courts retain autonomy in how they operationalize these critical concepts (as discussed 
below); but in principal, IP statutes must permit patenting in all fields.  
 
refuse, as a matter of policy, to issue patents to particular classes of goods, such as
pharmaceutical products and chemicals. Prior to the Uruguay Round, more than forty 
countries withheld any patent protection for pharmaceuticals, while many that did so 
issued patents only for processes and not for products (WHO, 2002: 15). In many 
developing countries, the lack of patent protection drove the growth of local 
pharmaceutical industries, which specialized in making generic versions of dr
patented in developed countries, some older drugs whose patents had expired. By 2005, 




d countries’ obligations for the treatment of already-existing knowledge that was 
previously ineligible for patenting. As developing countries introduce product patents on 
pharmaceuticals, must they make protection available to medicines that already exist? 
The issue involved is that inventions must be “novel” to receive patents. As a result, 
patent offices generally do not issue patents on goods that have already been patented
other countries.
15 But pharmaceutical companies did not bother applying for patents in 
countries where their products could not be patented at the time of invention.  
 
ion, granting patents to products that are not new for the duration of the p
the first country. For example, if a patent was applied for in the US in 1993, a country 
granting pipeline protection would, at the time its new patent law went into effect, offer
protection to that product until 2013, at the time the twenty-year patent would expire in 
the US. TRIPS does not oblige countries to offer this additional and retroactive form of 




 27.3.b allows countries to exempt plant varieties and animals from patentabilit
provided that they establish “effective” sui generis systems of protection for the former. 
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In addition to the question of what sorts of knowledge is eligible for patenting, 




What forms of protection are “effective,” however, remains contested. Most countries 
have adopted forms of plant variety protection in accordance with the conventions of th
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant, UPOV (Llewelyn, 2003;
CIPR, 2002: Chapters 3-4; Tansey, 1999). The rights afforded under UPOV conventions 
differ from patents in a number of significant ways, most importantly by allowing third 
parties to use protected seeds and plants for breeding new varieties. The UPOV 
convention, in its earlier (1978) version, also included a farmers’ exception that 
for the reuse of seeds, but this clause was eliminated in UPOV 1991, which provides 
much stronger rights to breeders. As the 1978 convention is no longer open for signing
countries that seek to satisfy their requirements under Article 27.3.b by conforming to 
UPOV standards must use the later convention.  
 
isms of protection are acceptable (Correa, 2003a; Llewelyn, 2003). Countr
have a wide array of options for how they fulfil their obligations for protecting plant 
varieties. India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act is frequently c
as an example of a non-UPOV system for protecting plant varieties, but India is not 
unique. According to one international survey of plant variety protection, while 91 
countries were reported to offer statutory protection to plant varieties (with legislatio
under consideration in another 29 countries), only 54 were members of UPOV (Bonwo
Nottenburg, and Pardey, 2004).  
 
d under TRIPS. In the first regard, some PTAs (e.g. those between the US and 
MENA countries and the US-Singapore agreement) explicitly require patents on plants
(El-Said, 2005; Fink and Reichenmiller, 2005), thus eliminating the Article 27.3.b 
flexibility. And even where plant patenting is not required, it is strongly encouraged
example, the US-Chile PTA and CAFTA both include language demanding that parties 
undertake efforts to develop legislation allowing for plant patents. Nor, in the absence of
plant patents, are alternatives to UPOV 1991 allowed. UPOV, which is not mentioned in 
TRIPS, is referred to explicitly in many PTAs as the minimum, with deadlines and 
timetables for accession to UPOV 1991 included as well. Thus, in sum, while a libe
reading of TRIPS would be that countries must provide protection – but not necessarily
patents or UPOV-style rights – to plant varieties, PTAs oblige countries to offer patents 
or, at the very least, a UPOV system. 
 
 the question of how patent offices examine applications. Under TRIPS, countrie
retain significant prerogatives for making private ownership of knowledge less automatic. 
Most obviously, the three standard criteria for patentability – that the idea be new, non-
obvious, and useful – are ambiguous terms. How these criteria are operationalized by 
national patent offices and legal systems affects what sorts of patents are granted. 
Practices established by the USPTO and EPO tend to establish some precedence in
regard, but this remains an important point of flexibility (CIPR, 2002: 114-119). 
Countries can set criteria for “novelty” that makes reformulations or second uses 
existing drugs ineligible for additional patents. Likewise, countries retain the freedom
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PTAs can erode these critical areas of policymaking space by exporting 
examin nd 
uired 
determine what classifies as “non-obvious.” India’s amended Patent Act is illustrative on 
both accounts: the Act excludes new uses from patenting by stating that “mere discovery” 
of new forms of known substances that “do not result in the enhancement of the known 
efficacy” of the substances are not patentable; and the definition of “inventive step” (use
synonymously with “non-obvious”) is worded in such a way as to provide administrative 
and judicial officials with grounds to deny many patent applications and thus effectively 
narrow patent scope (Basheer, 2006). 
 
 to “discoveries.”
17 That these are such imprecise terms certainly invites abuse, bu
it also allows policymakers to retain a narrow patent scope. Countries can, for example, 
deny patents to gene sequences, on the grounds that the technical step was a discovery of
an existing entity, not an invention of something new (Demaine and Fellmeth, 2003). 
Likewise, an inter-ministerial committee in India has been constituted to debate wheth
or not a limited definition of invention could be use to restrict pharmaceutical patents to 
new chemical entities (NCEs), and thus deny patents to incremental inventions.
18 Most 
controversially, restrictive definitions of invention and discovery have been used to deny
patents to computer software, under the argument that programmers are not inventing 
new processes but discovering (or, perhaps, revealing) underlying mathematical 
algorithms that are part of nature.
19
 
that in exchange for the exclusive rights obtained by the patent, applicants are 
required to make their knowledge public. The patent right sets restrictions on what can
done with the knowledge, but anyone can, upon payment of a nominal fee, read and thus 
learn from patents. Patent applicants, of course, wish to reveal as little of the knowledge 
as possible in exchange for exclusive rights, but there is a public interest in demanding 
greater disclosure. The extent to which new knowledge enters the public domain and 
becomes available for third parties (albeit with serious restrictions on the use of the 
knowledge), depends on how much disclosure patent examiners demand. This may b
particular importance the case in developing countries, where patents are more often used
to block rival imports, and not manufactured locally. Where the patent is not “worked” 
locally (more on this below), tacit knowledge is not shared, so obtaining the written 
knowledge becomes that much more essential.  
 
n. Many developing countries would like to see more benefit-sharing between 
biotech countries from the OECD, who have the technological prowess to turn genetic
resources into commercial goods, and local communities, who contribute to biotech 
innovations through stewardship of nature. To that end, countries rich in biodiversity
might require that patent applicants disclose the origin of the knowledge and materials
used – as a number of countries do.
20  
 
ation guidelines, thus removing the ambiguity that exists under TRIPS, a
placing caps on the amount and type of information that patent applicants can be req
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to submit. CAFTA, for example, defines “novelty” in a more expansive way, exporting to 
all CAFTA parties the more liberal meaning of “new” that is used in the US, where goods 
can pass the novelty test and be granted a patent if the knowledge has been disclosed 
within the year prior to application (Morin, 2004).
21 PTAs are also more likely to limit 
the sorts of disclosure requirements that national IP offices can place on patent 
applicants. Again, CAFTA is illustrative, for the agreement proscribes such requ
by establishing an explicit cap on the type and amount of information that countries can 
demand (Morin, 2004). Were a Central American country to demand more information 
from an applicant than what is necessary to repeat an invention, the country in question 
would most likely be in violation of its new regional obligations.
22
 
ation and disclosure requirements, using such options presents complex 
challenges for most developing countries. Patent applications, virtually by defin
include cutting-edge knowledge. Thus, knowing how much disclosure is “sufficient” c
be a complex task. Plus, the number of patent applications in most countries has 
increased astronomically in the last fifteen to twenty years, which means that nati
patent offices are flooded with applications on highly technical matters. For developing
countries, this raises two issues regarded to resource allocation. First, with regard to 
budgetary resources, having a patent office that is both efficient and effective (i.e. do
not take too long on any given patent application and thereby effectively undermine the 
existence of the system, but does not simply grant patents without undertaking thorough 
searches and scrutinizing disclosure) is expensive and requires that resources be allocated
to the task. Finger and Schuler (2000) note that the combined cost of implementing 
TRIPS and two other new Uruguay Round agreements would be roughly US$150 
million—and that is merely to implement the minimal standards. Having an efficie
effective patent system would add significantly to this figure. Second, with regard to 
human resources, the same requirements of efficiency and effectiveness mean that the
patent examiners themselves will have to be highly-skilled and well-trained professiona
with technical knowledge, normally with engineering and science backgrounds. Given 
that such skills are, by definition, in short supply in less developed countries (if a countr
had a surplus of scientists and engineers it would probably be more developed), the 
obvious question, then, regards the opportunity costs of deploying “the best and 
brightest” as patent examiners.  
 
: patent breadth and utility models.  Neither is addressed by either the WTO or 
preferential trade agreements. Breadth refers essentially to how many ideas (or claims) 
are protected by a single patent, and it, in turn, affects the terms on which follow-on 
innovators gain access to the patented knowledge (Merges and Nelson, 1990). Narrow
patents can create opportunities for local firms and innovators to “invent around” existin
patents without being subject to litigation. Indeed, the granting of narrow patents was a 
key feature of Japan’s postwar patent regime, one that is commonly cited as a model 
regime for late-industrializing technological followers (see discussions in Maskus and
McDaniel, 1999; Maskus, 2000; Chang, 2002; Kumar, 2003).
23
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in absolute terms (4456 to 1537).
, in that they offer protection in exchange for public disclosure of new knowledg
but they offer reduced protection (e.g. seven to ten years rather then twenty) for 
inventions that meet lower standards of inventiveness (the “non-obvious” criterio
are typically made available for incremental inventions that build on more fundamental 
discoveries (Maskus, 2000: 39 and 177; CIPR, 2002: Box 1.1 and p. 175). Utility models
are of particular interest in considering alternatives for IP management in developing 
countries because the degree of innovation required for protection is likely to be more 
appropriate for local firms. The sorts of innovations undertaken by local firms are less 
likely to meet the inventiveness threshold for patentability. By granting utility models, 
then, developing countries can reward the smaller and more incremental types of 
innovation that are common among local firms. 
  
nt dimensions of patent regimes. The sorts of innovations rewarded by utility
models may be developmentally significant and worth encouraging, even if not strictly
patentable. Analysts of the role of IPRs in East Asian development typically emphasize 
not just the the narrow scope of patentability, for example, but also the use of utility 
models in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Kumar, 2003; Maskus and McDaniel, 1999). 
Indeed, a great number of developing countries narrowed the scope of patent eligibi
the postwar era, but one crucial difference that set the the East Asian countries apart is 




 or utility models. However, as with scope and disclosure requirements, the 
opportunities for policy innovation – though important – are difficult to exploit. Pate
breadth, for example, tends not to be a function of statute so much as of administrative 
and judicial practice (i.e. how patent examiners proceed, and what legal doctrines judge
use in deciding infringement cases). Thus, it is “unclear how developing countries can 
ensure that courts interpret claims in a narrow way, unless this is laid down in detailed 
guidelines, a stupendous task in itself” (Watal, 1999: 119, note 12).  Likewise, an 
effective system of utility models requires significant government promotion, since
of the smaller, local firms whose innovations might qualify for this sort of protection 
have little familiarity with IP. Thus, despite the fact that that many developing countri
now offer utility models, applications tend to be low, suggesting that the systems exist 
but are not being used. In the case of Argentina, for example, which included utility 
models in introducing a new Patent Law in 1995, the uptake has been quite slow. In t
first year that utility models were available, not a single application was received. 
Although applications for utility models increased in subsequent years, the number
remained orders of magnitude less than applications for patents. From 1996-2002, th
National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) received a total of 1656 applications for 
utility models and 24,292 applications for patents. In fact, even Argentine nationals, who
accounted for less than 20 percent of patent applications but 93 percent of utility model 
applications, made significantly more patent applications than utility model applications 
25
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hts are Obtained under WTO and PTAs 
 
 
Table 3: How Private Rig
 
Issue Significance  TRIPS  Obligations    PTAs 
Scope   What products and processes are 





Countries must grant patents 











•  Historically many countries 
have reduced patent scope, no
granting patents in some 
sectors 
Can facilitate development of 
local technological capacities 
via imitation and reverse-
engineering 
Ethics and biodiversity 
 sectors that meet crite
of being new, inventive, and 
useful. 
•  Flexibility regarding how 
countries operationalize 
patentability criteria (e.g. 




•  Article 27.3.b allows f
alternative protection 
system for plant varieties 
 
tion  
e  •  Pipelin
protecti














How much information is 








•  Effects nature and amou
information in public dom
and thus available to third 
parties 
Can create opportunities for 
benefit sharing 
 













Not addressed by TRIPS  
•  Largely a function of 
N ber of separate ideas 
cted by individu e
•  Whether patent authori
grant narrow vs. broad patent
affects ability of third partie








cti uld not qualify 
Not addressed by TRIPS  -- 
(“petty 
patents”)
vides incentives to innovative 
vities that wo a
for patent protection 
•  Key to postwar technological 
transformation in late 
industrializers 
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imitation 2: The Extent of and Exceptions to Private Rights 
, but, as emphasized 




ionably obliges countries to provide IPRs that are stronger and 






tions can influence patterns of innovation by affecting the space left 










industry. Discussions of this issue typically make reference to “early working” (or 
L
 
The monopoly rights conferred by patents are not absolute
th
itations include both general and specific exceptions to exclusive rights. The 
former are available to anyone at any time, without the need to receive government 
authorization; they are not subject to time restrictions; and compensation to rights hol
are not required.
26 The latter, in contrast, require state authorization, apply only to th
party indicated by state authorities, are typically subject to time restrictions, and call for 





ed knowledge and states must comply with more restrictive conditions for 
authorizing third-party use (e.g. issuing compulsory licenses). Yet TRIPS permits 
significant levels of national-level variation with regard to both sorts of limitations
variation that, again, is largely precluded by PTAs. As we shall see, PTAs tend to p
even greater limits on third parties’ rights to access patented knowledge; in addition,






o which third parties can undertake experimentation, including for commercial 
purposes, is, in particular, an important element to promote innovation based on or 
around a patented invention” (Correa, 2000b: 854, emphasis added). Developing 
countries’ flexibilities in this regard are best illustrated by conceiving allowable 
exceptions along a spectrum. At one extreme would be the preclusion of all third-p
access to the patented knowledge. At another extreme would be consent to all thi
parties to use all patented knowledge for any purpose, including sales. Both of these 
extremes undermine the goals of an IP system: the first, to the far right in Figure On
grants too much protection, and unnecessarily restricts use; the second, to the far left 
Figure One, basically grants no protection at all, and may not provide sufficient 
incentives for generation and commercialization of new knowledge. Interim points on th
spectrum would include restricting access to public and non-commercial use, per
commercial experimentation in exchange for increasing the length of patent terms, 
permitting commercial experimentation without any such increases in patent terms, and 
permitting commercial production and stockpiling (though not commercial sales unt
patent expired). The key point for the present discussion is that only the final point – 
permitting commercial production and stockpiling – is proscribed by TRIPS.
28
 
These general exceptions are of tremendous importance in the pharmac
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ith the US sacrifice this flexibility by 





 leeway with regard to how they 
treat test data (Correa, 2002; Reichman, 2004; Pugatch, 2005). According to Article 39.3, 
countri
or does 
flects a different interpretation of “unfair commercial use,” one 





) provisions, which allow firms to develop, test, and apply for registration of 
generic versions of patented drugs, to be put on the market once the protected drugs
patent terms expire. Early working exceptions are generally thought of as providing 
important stimuli for the expansion of generic pharmaceutical industries and as measu
to reduce prices by expediting the entry of competition. In the U.S., the early working
exception is linked to easy and simplified extensions of the patent term, though such 
extensions are not obligatory under TRIPS.  
 
Countries that are members of PTAs w
al of generics. Data exclusivity is most relevant in sectors such as pharmaceut
(and chemicals more generally), where firms require approval of local regulatory 
authorities to enter the market. To obtain approval to market drugs, for example, 
pharmaceutical firms submit data, obtained through clinical trials, of the effectiven
their products. What is at issue is whether producers of generic medicines can use
data to secure regulatory approval. Alternatively, if the data is protected, generic firms 
must generate their own test data by replicating costly and time-consuming clinical trials
a process that delays the onset of price competition.
29
  
TRIPS leaves developing countries significant
es must protect data that is obtained through “considerable effort” against 
disclosure and against “unfair commercial use.” These requirements are strikingly vague. 
It is not clear what data is privy to protection (i.e. what is “considerable effort”), n
TRIPS specify a term of protection. Most critically, the article does not address whether 
regulatory authorities can, without disclosing the data, rely on the data submitted by one 
firm for the sake of approving new products. According to many legal scholars, doing so 




US trade policy re
h-based pharmaceutical industry, which seeks to recover the costs of increasingly 
expensive clinical trials,
31 the US has, since the late 1980s, adopted a position that 
governments should treat the data required for regulatory approval as a form of IP and 
guarantee the providing firms exclusive rights to “their” data and to the information
generated by the data (Brazell, 2004-2005; Dutfield, 2005c; Pugatch, 2005; Rosenthal, 
2005). Indeed, during the Uruguay Round the US attempted – unsuccessfully – to inc
much stronger language in its proposals for Article 39.
32 Unable to secure stronger data 
protection at the multilateral level, the US negotiators have made this issue a high priority 
on the bilateral agenda. Concretely, US PTAs generally include five-year periods of 
exclusivity, beginning at the time the drug is approved by local authorities, during which 
time all submitted data is protected against both disclosure and reliance.
33 Importantl
data exclusivity operates independently of the patent status: drugs that are unpatented, 
because the patent expired, or because no patent was obtained in the first place, can 
receive protection from generic competition for a minimum of five years. 
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rmine the boundaries of exceptions to exclusive rights with 
their policies towards “parallel imports,” whereby the government allows patented goods 
to enter es 
on – 
onal 
 leaves countries with the autonomy to select their own rules regarding 
exhaustion and parallel imports. This outcome,  an “agreement to disagree” (Fink, 1999: 
175), w ght 
ort 
 
as been able to secure greater IP protection through PTAs 
than the WTO by exporting national standards of exhaustion. US PTAs are not common 
market
The US insistence on increased protection of test data has been one of the mo
contentious issues in the negotiations of PTAs. Most countries have object
 that extensive data exclusivity hampers their ability to encourage generic 
competition and thereby reduce prices, and have proposed less restrictive provisions or 
sought ways to minimize their commitments. Yet US negotiators, rejecting the arg
that data exclusivity might have adverse effects,
34 have continued to make it a high 
priority. Chile, for example, sought to ameliorate the adverse effects of data exclusivity 
included in the US-Chile PTA by passing a law that requires drugs to be registered w
local authorities within one year of being approved by the US Food and Drug Authority 
in order to receive the extended period of data protection offered in the PTA. Data 
protection would be available, but only to new drugs. Learning from this example, the 
USTR has, in subsequent agreements, barred Chilean-style requirements. Thus, CA
“closes potential loopholes to [data protection] provisions” (USTR, 2003: 5) by explicit
requiring countries to allow up to five years from the time FDA approval is obtained to 




 the market once the patentee places the good on the market elsewhere. Countri
that permit parallel imports typically do so to increase competition, encourage arbitrage, 
and thus ensure affordability of patented goods. Whether they do so, however, is a 
function of national regulations on the “exhaustion of patent rights.” Once a good is 
placed on the market by the patent owner, it can be used by others without permissi
the patent rights are “exhausted.” The policy question is whether countries adopt nati
or international standards of exhaustion (or regional, as in the case of the EU), since 





as the result of a stalemate during the Uruguay Round negotiations: the US sou
to allow the adoption of national standards, European countries sought to protect the 
regional standards that are consistent with the common market, and developing countries, 
expecting parallel imports to serve as form of competition policy and also to open exp
opportunities, sought international standards. The subsequent agreement (Article 6) gives 
countries the right to choose national or international standards of exhaustion.
37 Any 
lingering uncertainty was resolved at Doha Ministerial, as the subsequent Doha 
Declaration (WTO, 2001) explicitly confirms countries’ rights to adopt the exhaustion
doctrines of their choice.
38  
 
Here again, the US h
s. Instead, each country in the “regions” created by US PTAs retain national 
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ons to patent-holders’ exclusive rights require government action. 
With a compulsory (or “non-voluntary”) license, the host government allows a local 
entity (  
y 
dically circumscribe the use 




in terms of national law, countries are left 






law is the issue of what grounds countries establish for issuing CLs. Here it is important 
to emph
 to public 




a private firm and/or government agency) to produce and distribute a good under
patent without the consent of the patentee. Compulsory licenses (Cls) have historicall
been part and parcel of countries’ patent regimes, and countries have granted them in a 
wide range of situations (Reichman and Hasenzahl, 2003).  
 
Despite efforts by the US in the Uruguay Round to ra
 (W
nomy in this regard. Article 31 of TRIPS establishes a set of conditions to be met 
for governments to issue CLs. For example, governments must proceed on a case-by-case
basis; third parties must first seek permission of the patent-holder (i.e. the CL must 
follow unsuccessful negotiations, though this is waved in case of national emergency); 
the CL must be of limited duration (and terminated when grounds leading to CL no 
longer there); it must be non-exclusive; it should be predominantly for domestic market
and the patent-holder should be compensated.  
 
When operationalizing these conditions 
ch negotiation for a voluntary license is required before a third party can 
legitimately request a compulsory license from the state. Third parties must attempt to 
gain authorization from the patentee, and the state may only grant a compulsory li
negotiations are not successful within a “reasonable period of time,” but the 
determination of “reasonable” is left to individual countries. Likewise, under the 
requirement that “adequate remuneration” be paid to the patentee (Art 31.h), 
can establish their own definitions of “adequate.” During the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the US sought to include a requirement to “compensate the right-holder 
fully” (Watal, 1999: 114), but this language is not included in TRIPS. And in b
instances, with regard to negotiations and compensation, TRIPS (Article 31.j) permits 
national-level interpretation and adjudication to be administrative, not necessarily 
judicial, which significantly increases the ease of requesting and acquiring CLs. 
 
Beyond the issue of how countries put their Article 31 obligations into na
asize that TRIPS does not specify any grounds for Cls; countries can issue CLs 
for whatever reasons they chose.
40 Although TRIPS stipulates some of the conditions to 
be met for governments to issue CLs, it leaves the grounds for doing so as matters of 
national policy. What this means is that so long as these conditions – operationalized 
locally – are met, countries establish their own grounds for issuing CLs. 
 
Developing countries’ rights to issue CLs, particularly with regard
 2001). Paragraph 5.b., for example, affirms that “each member has the right t
grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
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 of public health 
and, in particular, how countries can secure stable and reliable supplies of medicine, the 
relevan hes 
 
sing arrangements grounds for 
compulsory licenses, as China does, and thus help local firms gain access to patented 
knowle
and 
 “local working” requirement, recall two 




her or not countries can grant CLs in the absence of local production is an 
unresolved issue in TRIPS, though the answer appears to be that they can do so. On the 
one han r 
licences are granted.” Thus, developing countries are only required to abide by the 
conditions stipulated in Article 31. Furthermore, even some of these conditions can be 
waived in the context of national emergencies, and paragraph 5.c. of the Doha 
Declaration stipulates that “each member has the right to determine what constitutes a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency....”  
 
While much of the debate over CLs has been related to issues
ce and importance of compulsory licensing goes beyond public health and touc
a broad set of issues related to industrialization. Indeed, if one contrasts contemporary 
debates over CLs with the previous debates over CLs that occurred in the 1980s (Sell, 
1998: Chapter 4), it is striking how the overarching issues have changed: contemporary
debates are about public health, while previous debates were about the role of CLs in 
national strategies to promote indigenous technological advancement and industrial 
development. In discussing developing countries’ flexibilities in this regard, then, it is 
worthwhile to consider the broader relevance of CLs. 
 
Developing countries can make restrictive licen
dge on better terms. Or by requiring patent-holding firms to manufacture their 
inventions locally in order to retain exclusive rights, as many countries did in the past 
some (e.g. Brazil and India) continue to do under TRIPS, developing countries can 
encourage the transfer of non-codified, tacit knowledge that only occurs via the 
localization of manufacturing operations.  
 
To understand the importance of the
 countries, reflecting the extraordinary asymmetries in international technolog
capacities (see Table 1). Second, patent regimes in the developing world are less about 
stimulating innovation than about capturing the benefits of foreign innovation through the 
transfer, absorbtion, and adaptation of foreign technologies. A partial condition for 
technological learning is that the technology is used locally. Many developing countries 
maintain that if patented goods are simply imported, with local use impeded by the r
of foreign patent holders, technological transfer will be minimal. To the extent that 
governments want to improve local actors’ access to and ability to learn from foreign 
technologies, there may be a public interst in insuring that the technologies are used 




d, the previous discussion, which indicated countries’ freedoms to establish thei
own grounds for CLs, would suggest that such practices are permissible. On the other 
hand, the agreement also stipulates that patents “shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to … whether products are imported or locally 
produced” (Art. 27.1).
41
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e guidance on this issue from a conflict between the US and 
Brazil over the latter’s local working provisions.






 discussion of the US-Brazil conflict is 
worthwhile, for the entire affair underscores the salience of CLs as tools of 









d with regard to the “resolution” of the case, in particular the US change of 





We can take som
y law authorizes the government to issue CLs when manufactured goods are no
produced locally after three years from the grant of the patent. The US objected and 
requested a WTO hearing, accusing Brazil of being in violation of TRIPS. In June 2001,
when the two countries signed a joint communiqué announcing the withdrawal of the
U.S. challenge in the WTO, they also recognized that the fundamental conflict over 
Article 68 remains unresolved. In the meanwhile, however, Brazil’s law remains in for
and India retained a similar provision in final amendments to the Patent Act. Thus, it
fair to conclude that developing countries can include local working provisions in their 
patent regimes without violating TRIPS. 
 
Before proceeding, however, more
ialization and not just mechanisms to lower drug prices and promote public
The US challenge to Brazil’s IP regime has been portrayed as an attack on B
health strategy and as an instance where activist campaigning and negative publicity led 
the US to drop its case. Both interpretations are misleading, and probably wrong. With 
regard to the substance of the conflict, note that Brazil has two CL clauses, one for public
health (Art. 71) and one for local working (Art. 68). The US acknowledges that the 
former is acceptable under TRIPS, but objects to the latter, which, US officials complain 
explicitly, is about industrial promotion. According to the USTR’s 2001 Special 301
Report on IP practices, “should Brazil choose to compulsory license anti-retroviral AIDS 
drugs, it could do so under Article 71 of its patent law, which authorizes compulsory 
licensing to address a national health emergency, consistent with TRIPS, and which the 
United States is not challenging. In contrast, Article 68 – the provision under dispute –
may require the compulsory licensing of any patented product, from bicycles to 
automobile components to golf clubs. Article 68 is unrelated to health or access to drugs, 
but instead is discriminating against all imported products in favor of locally pro
products. In short, Article 68 is a protectionist measure intended to create jobs for 
Brazilian nationals” (USTR, 2001: 10). Thus, at the heart of the US challenge to Brazil 
was a conflict over industrial strategy and developing countries’ capacities to medi
their terms of integration into the international economy. In fact, as indicated in the 2000
Special 301 Report, where the USTR explained the rationale for the challenge in the fir
place, the US sought “to address the concern that other countries may cite the Brazilian 




erceived attack on Brazil’s HIV/AIDS treatment program, a more plausible 
explanation for why the US dropped the case is because it feared that Brazil would win. 
Indeed, the Brazilian government responded to the US challenge by pointing out tha
various provisions in US patent law also discriminate against non-nationals and violate 
Art. 27.1 of TRIPS. To be sure, the US government may have been attempting to quie
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th TRIPS retain significant 




 requirements, the US gets around the problem 
revealed by the conflict with Brazil by putting more explicit restrictions on CLs directly 
into the is 
e 
 
es off in terms of limiting 
developing countries’ abilities to deploy what historically have been standard tools to 
regulat r 
in 
critics when it chose not to press forward with the challenge, but it is also clear that 
leaving the issue unresolved in the form of a joint communiqué was preferable to losing 
the case and having a pro-industrial strategy precedent set.  
 
Although developing countries that are compliant wi
The trick is to fuse the conditions and grounds into specific and exclusive 
circumstances under which CLs can be issue. Although not all PTAs restrict the use of 
CLs, the trend is to allow governments to issue CLs only as remedies for anti-com
practices, for public, non-commercial use, and in times of national emergency or “other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.”
43 And even then, patent-holders are due “reasonable 
and entire compensation” (much tighter and stronger language than in TRIPS). The 
precise language is not the same in all the US PTAs. The strongest restrictions appear to 
be in the US-Singapore agreement, though similar language has appeared in drafts o
FTAA and the US-Andean PTA.
44  
 
With regard to local working
 relevant section of the PTA. To explain, Brazil’s local working requirement 
clearly within its CL rights under TRIPS Art. 31, but allegedly violates its non-
discrimination obligations under TRIPS Art 27. As indicated, one of the problems for th
US was that it too is in violation of TRIPS Art 27. PTAs eliminate this problem by 
proscribing such practices directly. By explicitly listing the limited and exclusive 
conditions under which CLs can be granted, local working requirements of the sorts
found in Brazil’s and India’s patent regimes are prohibited.
45
 
In sum, PTAs essentially pick up where the WTO leav
e patent holders. Neither sort of agreement prohibits CLs, but PTAs establish clea
and unequivocal biases against their use – biases that are significantly stronger than in 
TRIPS. Whereas TRIPS allows governments to issue CLs on any grounds provided that 
they take certain measures, some PTAs prohibit governments from issuing CLs except 
very strictly and tightly defined circumstances. The discussion of CLs is similar to that 
discussed above with regard to data exclusivity. In both instances, the provisions that the 
US insists on in PTAs are strikingly similar to the more restrictive clauses that the US 
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Table 4: Exceptions to Private Rights under WTO and PTAs 
 
Issue  As  Significance  TRIPS  Obligations    PT
Exceptions
























request or authorization or 
compensation.  
•  These exceptions allow t
parties to use patented g
and the knowledge disclosed 
in patents.  
Degree and nature of 
exceptions important for local
innovation and introdu
competition  
Early working (Bolar) 
provisions bring generic drug
into market more quick
are thus a key part of public 
health 
Third-party access to test data 
n neral, leaving significa
room for variation. 
•  Experimentation allowed, 
including commercial  
•  Early working does not have 
to be linked to extension of 
patent term 





















Countries can choose standards 




Permits arbitrage and thus 
e ces ability of patentee to  r
engage in price discriminati
•  Question of national or 
international standards of 
exhaustion  
•  Can lower prices of patented 
drugs, so particularly 












Countries can determine own 








ernment allows third party t
uce the patented p
without the consent of the 
patentee 
•  Historically used (or 
threatened) to combat patent 
abuse and induce licen
•  Key for lowering prices  
Important contribution to 
technological transformatio
structured to encourage loc
manufacturing by foreign 
patentees 
so long as they meet set of 
conditions 
•  Compulsory licensing on 
grounds of public health
acceptable. 
•  Legality of “local working
requirements debated but 
appears acceptable  
 
to extremely 
limited set of 
circumstances 
•  Declared 
national 
emergency
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imitation 3: The Duration of Private Rights 
 
anent as well, by granting longer 
patent terms of a minimum 20 years from the date of application. Efforts to reduce terms 
would a
d 
 particular importance in the pharmaceutical sector, where much of the 




 signatories offer longer patent terms, but obligations to 




Table 5: Duration of Private Rights under WTO and PTAs 
L
Lastly, TRIPS makes private rights more perm
lmost certainly be in violation of TRIPS and invite consultations and dispute 
resolution at the WTO. Thus, policy flexibility in this area is essentially negative – 




ay pass from the time a patent application is made until clinical tests are 
completed and the drug gains approval of health regulators. Not surprisingly, countrie
face pressures make available extensions to pharmaceutical patent terms, as the U
While one could only evaluate the merit of such claims on a case-by-case basis, as a 
matter of policy, developing countries may chose not to grant extensions or to place firm 
limits on any such extensions.  
 
PTAs do not require that
greements include clauses that establish conditions under which extensions must 
be granted, essentially exporting the most liberal readings of the relevant US legislation
Patents are to be extended on account of “unreasonable” delays on the part of the patent 
office or health authorities, revised formulations, or new uses. Again, the issue is not 
whether or not countries should grant extensions on any given drug at a given time, 
something that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, but whether countries 
should become party to an agreement that obligates them to do so automatically and 




Issue  s  Significance  TRIPS Obligations  PTA
Duratio





n  Shorter patents bring ideas into  Patents for 20 years from date  Automatic 
ain more quic
•  Countries typically varie
patent duration by product
•  Key for pharmaceuticals: 
patenting firms seek to 




•  Minimum period, 
uniform across sectors 







Two key points should stand out from the preceding contrast between the space 
r IP management available under the WTO and that available under PTAs. First, one 
need no s 
fo
t be an enthusiast or advocate of TRIPS to acknowledge that developing countrie
retain important opportunities for policy innovation in the field of IP. This is the case 
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III. Looking Forward: Policy Recommendations  
vising TRIPS may not be feasible (though 
erhaps desirable), efforts should also be made to protect and consolidate the remaining 
opp  
of the temporary 









with regard to the promotion of public health and biodiversity, as well as technological 
transformation and industrial development.  To be sure, many important policy 
instruments used in the past are now illegal; TRIPS does indeed usher in a new and more
constraining environment for IP management. But creative and forward-looking
governments can create TRIPS-compatible patent regimes that, by facilitating use and 
focusing on adaptation and learning, are appropriate for late development.
46 The s
take-away is that these opportunities are radically reduced, if not eliminated, by PTAs. 
On all three of the dimensions used to assess IP management – governments’ abilities to 
determine which knowledge becomes private property, to provide for exceptions to 
patent-holders’ exclusive rights, and to hasten arrival of the time that private knowledge 
enters the public domain – PTAs place significantly more burdensome and onerous 
obligations on developing countries than TRIPS does.
47 Whereas TRIPS represents a 
worrying step toward harmonization, PTAs step over the line and enter the danger zo
Indeed, the most profound threats to developing countries’ abilities to use IP managem
for national development purposes are found in PTAs. These agreements threaten the 




Recommendation 1: Consolidate Gains 
 
While eliminating or significantly re
p
ortunities for policy innovation. This logic should inform developing countries’
approaches toward three of the issues currently on the agenda in the TRIPS Council: 
public health, patenting life forms, and non-violation complaints.   
 
•  Developing countries should continue to seek formalization 
compulsory license. This is probably not an urgent matter, for the August 2003
settlement is likely to be treated by all WTO members as if it were a formal 
amendment to TRIPS, but so long as formalization of some sort is on the agenda
developing countries would do well to prevent backsliding. Critically, develo
countries must ensure that the waiver to Article 31.f is not limited to a particular 
set of diseases. 
Likewise, developing countries might wish to make permanent the exceptions to 
patent scope set
probably not an urgent matter, as the principal demanders of stronger IP 
protection in PGRFA appear to be comfortable with the status quo.  So long as 
this issue remains on the agenda, however, developing countries need to m
sure that their rights to limit patents in genetic resources are not further eroded. 
Importantly, developing countries must ensure that non-UPOV systems for plan
variety protection remain acceptable under TRIPS. 
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ecommendation 2: Strengthen the WTO to Dampen Proliferation of PTAs  
Developing countries should recognize that the WTO, for all its warts, is the best 
framew
ccess 








 IP that do not violate TRIPS, even if those actions hurt other parties. TRIPS 
included a five-year moratorium (until 1999) on such “non-violation complaints,” wh
has since been renewed. Many developed countries would like to end the moratorium. 
Developing countries should emphatically reject this proposal. After all, the USTR’s 
Special 301 report on IP practices is an annual laundry list of non-violation complaint
One (perhaps the only) advantage of integrating IP in the international trade system was 
to create international standards and multilateral procedures, to make US and European 
bilateralism less salient. Defending the relevance of TRIPS as the international standard,
rather than “TRIPS Plus” standards demanded by the US, has been the developing 
countries’ major accomplishment in the post-Uruguay Round period (Shadlen, 2004





ork available and, moreover, the strongest bulwark against the proliferation of 
PTAs. A WTO that works as a forum for coordinating trade policies and resolving 
disputes can decrease the attractiveness of bilateral and regional accords and give 
developing countries reliable alternatives to the US. Critically, expanding market a
in the WTO by increasing the sectoral scope of trade liberalization and reducing MFN 
tariffs dilutes the preferential access that comes with PTAs, and thus can diminish 
enthusiasm for such agreements.  
 
 make concessions. Thus, to the extent they have an interest in addressing the 
underlying dynamics driving the proliferation of PTAs, they have an interest in seriou
bargaining and negotiations at the multilateral level. That means building coalitions, 
actively participating in negotiations in multiple arenas, and brokering compromises 
among themselves and with developed countries. Developing countries will not be ab
dictate subsequent agreements, of course, but the realization that an unstable WTO 
contributes to the proliferation of PTAs and an even more threatening global IP 
environment should focus energies on making the WTO work better.  
 
zation, may elicit more market access at the multilateral level and thereby damp
the proliferation of IP-excessive PTAs, but it is not at all clear that the subsequent 
multilateral trade regime that all this bargaining might produce would be propitious
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Recommendation 3: Clarifying the Link Between TRIPS and the Convention on 
Biodiversity(CBD) 
 
The relationship between TRIPS and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has 
been a contentious issue throughout the Doha round. In March 2004, a group of 
developing countries submitted a formal paper to the TRIPS Council to establish 
guidelines for subsequent negotiations on three core provisions of the CBD: disclosure of 
origin, prior informed consent, and benefit-sharing. Specific papers on each topic have 
been submitted at subsequent quarterly meetings of the TRIPS Council.  
 
The developing countries have pushed the hardest with regard to disclosure of 
origin. TRIPS allows countries to make disclosure obligations part of national patent 
regimes (though, as indicated, this is prohibited in many PTAs), but, it is argued, this 
does source countries little good since the commercialization of the inventions based on 
biological resources occurs in OECD countries. Thus, to prevent uncompensated use of 
their genetic resources (“biopiracy”), developing countries seek to amend TRIPS to make 
disclosure of origin part and parcel of patenting in all countries. This campaign, not 
surprisingly, has been fiercely resisted by the leading developed countries, particularly 
the US and Japan, producing deadlock in the TRIPS Council.  
 
Led by Brazil, India, and Peru, the developing countries have continued to keep 
the CBD-related issues on the WTO agenda. The political reality suggests they are not 
likely to make much progress on this front, for disclosure of origin obligations would 
entail amending TRIPS (particularly Articles 27 and/or 29), and the experience of the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health suggests that developing countries are 
more likely to succeed in gaining clarification of and compliance with existing 
regulations than securing changes to the agreement itself. To be sure, developing 
countries may wish to keep the issue alive, to bring attention to their concerns over fair 
and equitable use of biological resources. Yet it is worth noting that some scholars – 
including those who are quite sympathetic to the concerns of developing countries (e.g. 
Dutfield, 2005a and 2005b) – suggest that pressing ahead on disclosure of origin 
obligations in the WTO may not be worth the effort. After all, the term “biopiracy” is 
used to refer to activities that should be proscribed (and Peru submitted a paper to the 
TRIPS Council in March 2005 which documented its efforts to combat such activities), 
but it is also used at times to refer to activities that are (or should be) legitimate and 
encouraged. Moreover, Dutfield (2005a) suggests that careful examination would most 
likely reveal fewer cases of the former than commonly thought, and even in those 
instances, it is not clear that amending TRIPS to require disclosure of the source of 
relevant materials would have had the intended effect.
48  
 
An alternative (though closely related) proposal is to require patent applicants to 
submit a certificate from the source country verifying that genetic resources were 
acquired properly and in conformity with the Bonn Guidelines of Access to Genetic 
Resources. The certificate would not be included in the specification – i.e. would not be 
part of the application judged by examiners – but would instead be part of the application 
process, akin to examination and renewal fees (Dutfield, 2005b). This is close to what 
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India proposed in October, and developing countries should push to keep it on the 
agenda. 
 
Ultimately, the bottom line is that the overwhelming share of the world’s genetic 
resources are in the global south, while the technology to commercialize these resources 
and the markets that make commercialization worthwhile are in the north. The objective, 
of course, is not to freeze the use of such resources, but to encourage additional 
research.
49 Thus, developing countries should continue to seek rules that that promote 
necessary collaboration and develop indigenous technological capacity to maximize the 
developmental payoffs of national biodiversity. To the extent that multilateral 
negotiations provide opportunities to advance these development goals, they should be 
exploited. 
 
Recommendation 4: Reform DSM to make TRIPS a Strategic Asset 
 
Developing countries should also continue their efforts to introduce IPR-linked 
retaliation in reforms of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Although the DSM’s 
findings are binding, compliance and enforcement remain national-level affairs: if a 
country does not change its practices and enter into conformity with WTO rules, 
aggrieved countries are authorized to enact retaliatory trade sanctions against the violator. 
From a North-South perspective, one of the principal limitations of the DSM is that this 
enforcement mechanism, trade sanctions, may not be feasible for developing countries to 
use against developed countries, given the asymmetry in trade dependence. For most 
developing countries, for example, their imports from the US or the EU amount to a 
much greater share of total imports than American or European exports to that country 
amount to their total exports. If a developing country were to enact retaliatory trade 
sanctions against the US in response to the latter country’s violation of a WTO 
agreement, for example, a large part of the developing country’s economy would be 
affected, for better or worse, but US trade officials would hardly notice.  
 
Some proposals for reforming the DSM focus on giving developing countries 
more useful enforcement mechanisms, one of those being the ability to withhold or 
suspend IP protection. Think of the agreements in the WTO as embodying an exchange, 
whereby developing countries receive improved access to developed countries’ markets 
and developed countries receive improved treatment of their IP in developing countries. 
Suppose one side fails to live up to its commitments and is judged by a dispute settlement 
panel to be in violation of an agreement. Developed countries can retaliate by denying 
market access to the guilty party, thus removing precisely the benefit that makes WTO 
membership appealing. A reformed system would, in the inverse situation, allow 
developing countries to retaliate by withholding what the developed country most values: 
protection of IP. Were a developing country to respond to a US violation in this way, US 
trade officials would indeed take notice.  
 
The WTO does allow cross-retaliation, such as the use of TRIPS to retaliate 
against a violation of GATT or GATS, but only when the aggrieved party can 
demonstrate that it is necessary, because retaliation within the same agreement is either 
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impossible or would inflict additional damage on domestic interests. Such requests must 
be approved.
 50 Developing countries should seek a reform to the DSM that would permit 
cross-retaliation without the need to request permission. 
 
Recommendation 5: Improve TRIPS mechanisms for Technology Transfer 
 
Developing countries should seek to strengthen the technology transfer (TT) 
requirements that exist in TRIPS. The issue here is that while TRIPS establishes 
technology transfer as an objective (Article 7) and even requires developed countries to 
encourage and promote TT toward the Least Developed Countries (Article 66.2), the 
obligations are not binding in an effective sense. The asymmetry is noteworthy: the threat 
of DSM looms large for developing countries that fail to meet their TRIPS obligations in 
terms of adopting and implementing the new minimal standards, but developed countries 
do not fear such legal sanctions for failing to meet their own obligations in terms of 
promoting TT.  
 
Often the reason cited for this discrepancy is an asymmetric capacity to use the 
DSM, but that is probably not a sufficient explanation. After all, developing countries 
have become regular users of the DSM in other areas, so ability to access the system must 
not be the impediment. Rather, the problem is derived from the ambiguity of the 
obligation to promote technology transfer. Unlike the specific obligations for establishing 
and protecting IP, no such specificity exists in terms of promoting TT. Indeed, the lack of 
any clear operational definition of TT only furthers the problem. If pressed, officials from 
developed countries would maintain that they do promote TT via disclosure and 
promoting secure property rights.
51 In other words, since there is no clear sense of what it 
means to “promote TT,” nor a strong sense of the relationship between IP and TT 
(Correa, 2005; Maskus, 2004), it is possible for any developed country government to 
claim that its actions are intended to have the effect of TT promotion. Developing 
countries can and should press is for clear and specific delineation of developed 
countries’ obligations in the area of TT.  
 
Recommendation 6: Reforming and Restructuring Technical Assistance 
 
Developing countries should push strongly for fundamental changes to the 
amount and form of technical assistance. Developed countries have already committed to 
providing technical assistance, but the amount and form of such assistance is not clear, 
nor are the mechanisms for providing such assistance adequate.  
 
Most immediately, developing countries should seek to establish explicit targets 
to use as reference points. Even if these are informal (i.e. not legally binding 
commitments, which would be unacceptable), such targets can serve as useful reference 
points. 
 
More critically, developing countries should push for revisions to how technical 
assistance is provided. Currently, “technical assistance” and “capacity building” takes the 
form of officials from WIPO, USPTO and EPO (along with aid agencies) advising 
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relevant officials and judges in the developing world on IP matters and assisting countries 
in implementing their TRIPS obligations. This assistance is neither “technical,” in the 
sense of their being a standard set of practices that need only to be understood and 
implemented, nor “neutral” (May, 2004). To the contrary, “technical assistance” and 
“capacity building” are intensely political, and their effects are distributional.  
 
A logical recommendation derived from this paper is that technical assistance 
should not come from developed countries, which push developing countries to exceed 
their TRIPS obligations, but rather from developing countries that have reformed their IP 
regimes and thus fulfilled their TRIPS obligations, but have done so in ways that 
continue to promote development objectives. Again, Brazil and India should be held up 
as models, and technical assistance and capacity building programs should be geared to 
assist countries to act similarly. 
 
Given that the WTO lacks the capacity to provide technical assistance, this issue 
will be referred principally to WIPO. Thus, developing countries should continue to push 
for changes to WIPO’s orientation and mission. 
 
 
Ken Shadlen is Lecturer in  Development Studies at the Development Studies Institute 
(DESTIN) at the London School of Economics and Political Science; inquiries can be 
directed to k.shadlen@lse.ac.uk. 
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ENDNOTES
 
1Other forms of IPRs include plant breeders’ rights and utility models, both of which are 
closely related to patents, along with geographical indications and trademarks. 
2This is an important point to note, as it is often overlooked in popular discussions of IP. 
When policymakers and patent owners from the US complain that the Indians, for example, 
“don’t protect our patents,” their complaint is misleading, for by definition patents granted in the 
US have no legal standing in India. More accurately, the “they don’t protect our patents” 
complaint is shorthand for saying that other countries do not afford the same rights as the US 
does to knowledge that the USPTO has established to be IP (i.e. “their IP systems are different 
from ours”!). 
3These three dimensions are typically lumped together to form composite measures of 
“strength” of IPRs. Countries that make private property rights easier to obtain, more absolute, 
and last for longer periods of time score relatively higher – they have “stronger” IP. My 
discussion of the three limitations allows me to unpack and disaggregate conventional measures 
of strength. 
4Indeed, IPRs aim to stimulate the creation of new knowledge by restricting access to existing 
knowledge. 
5For such countries, the relationship between strength of IPRs and innovation is more linear, 
closer to curve C in Figure One. But even this relationship only holds to a point: even in wealthier 
countries, if IPRs become too strong, innovation can be stifled (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998; David, 1993; Merges and Nelson, 1990). 
6See, among others, Drahos (1995); Matthews (2002); Ryan (1998); Sell (1998, 2003). 
7Although clearly at the forefront of the drive to link IPRs to trade, the U.S. did not act alone. 
The EU’s 1984 “New Commercial Policy Instrument,” which is like Section 301 in authorizing 
trade sanctions against countries involved in acts of “illicit trading,” also includes inadequate 
protection of EU firms’ IP as an actionable offense (van Bael and Bellis, 1990: 336-339). 
Matthews (2002) and Pugatch (2004) both analyze the role of business lobbyists in shaping 
European policy toward IP. 
8The reigning (but not unquestioned) logic underlying the new approach is that increasing the 
security of IPRs will attract foreign investment and make patent holders more willing to transfer 
technology via licensing arrangements. I discuss this more in the conclusion. 
9Article 66.1 gives the least-developed countries the right to request a ten-year extension of 
the transition period. 
10For more discussion, see Shadlen (2004). In contrast to misinterpretations that the Doha 
Declaration weakened TRIPS (e.g. Pugatch, 2005), I emphasize that this agreement neither added 
to nor subtracted from developing countries’ IP obligations under the WTO (indeed, that was the 
litmus test that the US applied throughout the entire negotiating process), but clarified and 
reaffirmed rights that developing countries already had under TRIPS. Both authors argue that the 
US and EU seek PTAs because they are unsatisfied with the level of IP protection secured under 
TRIPS, but our different interpretations are informed by different causal logics. For Pugatch, 
PTAs allow US and EU to compensate for the erosion of TRIPS; for Shadlen, PTAs allow US 
and EU to compensate for what they regard as the inadequacy of TRIPS. The differences are 
subtle but crucial. It is not the weakening of TRIPS per se that has driven the US and EU toward 
PTAs, but rather, the fact that developing countries have asserted (and, at times, exploited) their 
rights under TRIPS. 
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11See, among others (and by order of publication), Maskus, 1997; Drahos, 2001; Vivas-Eugui; 
2003; Oxfam, 2004; Roffe, 2004; El-Said, 2005; Dutfield, 2005c; Shadlen, 2005a. 
12In the Americas, the US has agreements with Chile, Mexico and Canada, and five countries 
of Central America plus the Dominican Republic. Negotiations are underway with Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru (with Bolivia as observer), and also Panama. And, of course, there is the 
hemispheric Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, which would include thirty-four countries 
(all the sovereign states of the Americas with the exception of Cuba). Outside of the Americas, 
the list of PTAs that are either completed or in the process of negotiation includes (by region), the 
Southern African Customs Union; Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman (also Israel, but the US-
Israeli agreement does not include IP provisions); Australia, Singapore, and Thailand. See 
www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html 
13In the 1800s and early 1900s, many countries did not grant patents at all, and many did so 
only to nationals. See Machlup and Penrose (1950), Schiff (1971), Chang (2002). 
14Countries that did not previously grant patents on pharmaceuticals and agricultural 
chemicals were given until 2005 to begin doing so. 
15Typically one year, but the precise time varies. 
16It is important to clarify that TRIPS also has a requirement for pipeline protection for drugs 
with priority dates after 1995. Countries that were phasing in the introduction of product patents 
on pharmaceuticals were required to accept patent applications in a “mailbox” and, at the point 
when patenting became available, consider applications according to their original priority dates. 
But TRIPS does not oblige countries to grant patents or even accept mailbox applications on 
drugs that existed prior to 1995, only to drugs that came on the market post-1995. Countries with 
pipeline protection extend retroactive patenting back beyond 1995. 
17The word “invention,” one of the cornerstones of IP, is not defined in TRIPS. 
18Personal communication with Shamnad Basheer, 13 November 2005. 
19Note, however, that not patenting software does not exempt countries from their obligations 
to provide copyright protection to software as a form of artistic expression. This is a firm and 
immutable obligation – albeit a new one – and an area where the US exerts considerable pressure 
(Shadlen, Schrank, and Kurtz, 2005). 
20Correa (2003b) discusses options and provides examples of from Brazil, Costa Rica, India, 
and the Andean Group (Box 1). 
21Another example of harmonization is the inclusion of the same definition of “utility” that is 
used in the USPTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines into the CAFTA. However, in this particular 
instance, the definition of utility that all CAFTA parties are obliged to adopt actually raises the 
bar and provides more grounds to deny patents. It is a rare instance of downward harmonization 
(Morin, 2004). 
22Not surprisingly, disclosure of origin has been a point of contestation in the PTA 
negotiations between the US and Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The South American countries, 
as members of the Andean Pact, have requirements that may remain permissible. 
23Note that there is little evidence that the stronger patent protection introduced in Japan in the 
1980s increased the level of innovation (Sakakibara and Bransteller, 1999). 
24Contrasting India with the rapidly developing countries of East Asia, Kumar (2003) 
attributes the development of India’s large and robust domestic pharmaceutical industry to the 
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decision to make drugs ineligible for product patents (an uncontroversial point made by many), 
but also attributes the comparatively poor performance of the domestic mechanical engineering 
industries to the absence of utility models. 
25Data on file with author, from INPI. 
26Because of their open-ended and automatic nature, these sorts of exceptions tend to be 
limited (e.g. private non-commercial use, educational use, research and experimentation). 
27The relevant articles in TRIPS are Article 30 (general exceptions) and Article 31 (specific 
exceptions). 
28In the EU-Canada case, the WTO Appellate Body approved commercial experimentation but 
ruled that for Canada to permit generic firms to engage in actual production and stockpiling of the 
new products prior to the expiration of the patent was a violation of TRIPS. 
29The emphasis here is on cost. Obviously there would also be critical ethical issues raised by 
the replication of clinical trials with control groups. 
30Reichman, for example, cites a number of cases in OECD countries in support of the 
principle that using regulatory data to allow others to compete with equal products does not 
amount to “unfair commercial use” (2004: 11-12). 
31Estimates of the costs of developing new drugs and bringing them to market spark immense 
disagreement and conflict, but few disagree that the costs of clinical trials have indeed escalated 
rapidly.  
32Correa (2002) and Reichman (2004) both discuss the negotiating history on this issue. The 
US proposals, which would have prohibited not only disclosure but the use of the data by 
governments and third parties, were included as bracketed text in a1990 draft of the agreement, 
the so-called “Brussels draft.” But the bracketed text was omitted in its entirety from the 
subsequent text that formed the basis of the final agreement, from the “Dunkel Draft of 1991” and 
from the TRIPS agreement itself. 
33For agricultural chemicals, the period of protection is ten years. It is also worth noting that 
the period of data protection in the EU is longer than in the US, but the EU does not require its 
partners to adopt European standards in PTAs (Pugatch, 2005). 
34“Stronger patent and data protection increases the willingness of companies to release 
innovative drugs in free trade partners’ markets, potentially increasing, rather than decreasing, the 
availability of medicines” (USTR 2004). See also, the statement of former USTR Mickey Kantor 
(Kantor 2005). 
35Related to data exclusivity regulations are provisions included in some PTAs that bar 
regulators from approving generic versions of products that are patented and require regulatory 
authorities to notify patent-holders of any requests for such authorization, regardless of whether 
the patented drugs are registered and marketed locally. While these requirements seem 
unproblematic on the face of it (if the drug is patented, then the sale of generic versions would not 
illegal), observers have raised a number of concerns. First, they place a legal responsibility on 
government agencies whose remit is not patent law but health and safety regulation. Second, the 
burden of defending a patent is partially transferred from the private rights-holder to the public. 
36Countries can use different standards of exhaustion for copyrights, patents, and trademarks. 
Cottier and Mavroidis (2003) and Fink (1999) provide overviews of the complexities of 
exhaustion.  
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37Later in the agreement, Article 28.1(a) requires that states give patent holders the right to 
block their patented goods from being made, sold, or imported locally, which would appear to 
ban parallel imports. Yet this article includes a footnote that specifically cross-references the 
former article and in doing so reaffirms countries’ freedom to select their own standards of 
exhaustion. 
38Paragraph 5.d of the Doha Declaration: “The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each 
member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the 
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.” 
39Readers in the US should note the on-going conflict over whether American citizens should 
be allowed to purchase drugs from pharmacies in Canada and import these drugs into the US. 
This is a conflict over parallel importation.
40In fact, the only time grounds are mentioned explicitly is in Art 31.k, which addresses CLs to 
remedy anti-competitive practices – and this clause suspends some of the aforementioned 
conditions (e.g. prior negotiations are not necessary and the CL does not need to be 
“predominantly” for domestic use). 
41Not surprisingly, these apparently contradictory clauses have led to conflicting 
interpretations. Correa (1999: 9) notes that the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as 
Articles 7 and 8, states that the promotion of technology transfer is one of the overriding 
objectives of the agreement, and that all subsequent articles are to be read in the light of these 
objectives. To the extent that having the ability to issue a compulsory license on the grounds of 
the patent holders’ failure to work the patent locally can be an effective means to achieve 
technology transfer, then such measures would be compatible with TRIPS. Furthermore, a 
number of scholars note that Article 5A of the Paris Convention, which remains in force under 
TRIPS (Article 2.2 stipulates that nothing in TRIPS derogates provisions of the Paris 
Convention), allows countries to define non-working in this way. Other scholars reject these 
interpretations. Watal (1999: 110), for example, though acknowledging the disagreement and 
ambiguity, points out that during the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Art 27.1 was 
intended precisely to prevent governments from forcing local manufacturing through the use of 
compulsory licenses, and the Vienna Convention on International Treaties suggests that the 
original intent of a given clause should be used to guide subsequent interpretations. 
42Brazil’s patent law provides “a good test on the extent to which working obligations are 
admissible in the framework of article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement” (Correa 2000b: 857). 
43Of course, this allows the US (and other parties) to challenge whether or not countries are 
experiencing emergencies. Recall that the language of the Doha Declaration, in which countries 
make their own determinations regarding national emergencies, is not relevant in PTAs.  
44The language on CLs in the US-Morocco PTA, in contrast, is much weaker, a fact that drew 
the wrath of the US industry group that advises USTR on the IP aspects of trade policy, the 
Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights for Trade Policy (IFAC-
3). “IFAC-3 notes that the [US-Morocco PTA] fails to include explicit restrictions on a country’s 
authority to grant compulsory licenses to situations that are needed to remedy anti-trust 
violations; national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency; and to govern 
situations of public non-commercial use. IFAC-3 believes that it is critical that future FTAs 
include these compulsory licensing restrictions, which were found in the Singapore FTA” (IFAC-
3, 2004: 14). 
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45I am omitting discussion of Article 31.f, which requires that products produced under CL be 
“predominantly” for domestic use. This restriction was partially waived in August 2003 in the 
case of pharmaceutical products to be exported to countries lacking manufacturing capacity (see 
Matthews 2004). Note that when Canada amended its patent legislation to incorporate this 
waiver, it did so without violating NAFTA. 
46Thus, the passages regarding TRIPS in Wade (2003: 623-627 [Gallagher, 2005: 82-86]), 
which are based on my work and which I co-authored (Wade, 2003: footnote 6 [Gallagher, 2005: 
100, note 5]), are incomplete and misleading. 
47I discuss the differences between WTO and bilateral-regional restrictions on policy space 
more generally in Shadlen (2005a). Another way that PTAs affect IP management, which does 
not fit neatly into any of the three dimensions, is that US PTAs include investment agreements 
with investor-state arbitration clauses. Importantly, investment is defined to include IP, and any 
regulation on patent-holders’ rights that could be construed as diminishing the value of their 
assets (“investments”) could be grounds for a lawsuit. 
48“It may be better to target IP rulemaking in other areas…where the stakes are likely to be 
much higher than to push aggressively for the introduction of an international disclosure of origin 
rule that may in fact offer little practical benefit to any national economy or population” 
(Dutfield, 2005a: 1). 
49By way of caution, see, for example, the critical comments made by national researchers 
about Brazil’s tight regulations of genetic resources in “Is Brazil beating biopiracy or biodiversity 
research?” (SciDev.net, 1 November 2005). 
50Indeed, Ecuador had such a request approved for cross-retaliation against the EU but did not 
act. More recently, Brazil formally requested permission from WTO to use IP sanctions to punish 
the US in the dispute over cotton subsidies (“Brazil Asks to Suspend TRIPS, GATS Rules in U.S. 
Cotton Retaliation,” Inside US Trade, October 7, 2005), though this request was ultimately 
suspended after negotiations between the two countries. 
51Art. 66.2 does not actually refer to IP, so developed countries can claim to be fulfilling their 
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